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Abstract
This paper analyzes and measures the value that American private banks added
as directors of non financial companies. Using data between 1874 and 1913, and an
event study from 1906, I find that bank directors added about 20% of a firm’s market
capitalization. Collusive practices encouraged by private banks accounted for 65%
of this value, and were the equivalent of creating a three player market among
railroads. About 35% of the value added by banks came from better governance. I
argue that although policymakers were partly right in sidelining private banks as
activist investors, this helped entrench managers.
JEL: G21, G24, G3, K21, L41, N21. Keywords: Antitrust; Collusion; Corporate
Governance; Financial History.
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The separation of ownership by shareholders and control by managers is a well known
weakness of publicly traded companies in the United States. Berle and Means (1932)
documented how these firms’ ownership became dispersed at the end of the nineteenth
century. This corporate governance setup has led to recurring scandals: in 1905, in the
aftermath of the 1929 market crash, and at the turn of the twenty-first century. These
commotions were no doubt exacerbated by the combination of powerful executives, pliant
boards, and helpless equity holders1. Roe (2004) argues that policymakers have only
patched up the problems arising from these scandals, but have not resolved their root
causes.
There are several explanations for the separation of ownership and control. Berle
and Means (1932) argued that it resulted naturally from the trade-o↵ between liquid
capital markets and agency problems. For them, agency problems between managers
and shareholders were outweighed by the benefits of liquid equity markets with dispersed
owners. Following this train of thought, Jensen (1989) reasoned that if agency problems
became too serious, it would be worthwhile to take the companies private again. The
liquidity-agency cost trade-o↵ explains why countries with more acute agency problems
than those in the United States never saw the proper development of stock markets2.
Chandler (1977) argued that shareholders were not only unwilling but also unable to un-
derstand the complex organizations that emerged during the second industrial revolution,
and that the separation of ownership and control was just a practical admission of this
ignorance.
Roe (2004) distinguishes two problems arising from the separation of ownership and
control. First, managers or large shareholders may engage in self dealing at the expense
of small shareholders. The second problem is that managers may not exert themselves
to shareholders’ best interests. Roe argues that there are three types of institutions
that can mitigate both these problems. First is the existence of vigorously competi-
tive product and labor markets that discipline managers. The second set of remedies
1Even within similar legal systems, American shareholders have significantly less powers than their
British counterparts, as documented by Bebchuk (2005)
2This also explains why the United States witnessed a significant LBO movement in the eighties, as
agency problems worsened significantly after the diversification merger wave in the early seventies.
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includes temporary monitors such as raiders in hostile takeovers, event driven activist
hedge funds, LBOs, bankruptcy, and lawsuits. These temporary instruments, however,
work well only in some types of companies. The third solution is to have permanent man-
agerial monitors, either through strong boards or powerful permanent investors3. This
solution is unlikely to arise because boards without strong owners have little incentive
to monitor. Furthermore, powerful owners are di cult to come by naturally, since not
enough founders or their descendants are willing to keep undiversfied and illiquid invest-
ments. Intermediary permanent monitors such as activist banks face legal restrictions in
the United States. Roe has correctly argued that politics have played a critical role in
American corporate governance by restricting such activist equity intermediaries. In fact,
judges and lawmakers, from Brandeis (1914), the U.S. Senate through the Pecora Report
(1934), to Douglas (1940), have resisted bankers from shaping corporate strategy4. Was
this political decision rational?
This paper tries to show that blocking activist financial institutions did increase wel-
fare, but that this solution was too blunt, as it damaged corporate governance and ce-
mented the separation of ownership and control in the United States. There are four ac-
cusations that have been historically levelled against activist private banks (these where
the American version of universal banks). The first criticism is that they had conflicts of
interest as directors and suppliers of securities and other financial services. This was first
aired in the Armstrong Investigation in 1905, and repeated during the Pujo and Pecora
Federal Investigations in 1912 and 1934. I will try to show that there is no compelling
evidence for this reproach at the time5. The second argument against private banks is
that they were a tight oligopoly. This critique was first made in the Pujo Hearings in
19126, and repeated later by Brandeis (1914) and Douglas (1940). Although it is true
3These monitors could, for example, create pay that would give executives an incentive to perform.
In practice, Roe argues that incentive pay has been more a symptom of the problem of managerial self
dealing than part of the solution to avoid their shirking.
4Douglas, SEC Chairman: ”Insofar as management [and] formulation of industrial policies ... the
banker will be superseded. Pecora Report (1934), ”The investment company became the instrumentality
of financiers and industrialists to facilitate acquisition of concentrated control of wealth and industries
of the country’ (p. 333)’
5See Kroszner and Rajan (1994) for an in depth study of this issue for later periods
6see Carosso 1970
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that there are some bottlenecks in the finance industry - in the securities issuance, for
instance - all the major antitrust suits against investment banks have gone nowhere. The
third criticism of private banks is that they were unable to understand and control a
manager in a modern corporation. Although the value of a monitoring and permanent
equity intermediary has been theoretically established by Holmstrom and Tirole (1997)7,
Chandler (1977) questions the idea that any outside director can meaningfully under-
stand modern organizations. It is also true that Kuhn Loeb executives admitted this
during the Armstrong Investigation. Nonetheless, a careful analysis of the data in this
paper indicates that private banks added between 6 and 7 percent of value due to better
governance. The fourth criticism against banks was first made by Moody (1904) and later
repeated in the Pujo Hearings in 1912 and by Brandeis (1914). This was that private
banks stifled non-financial competition, a result confirmed by Cantillo (1998).
This paper studies how exactly private banks limited railroad competition in the
aftermath of the Sherman Act. After 1894, private banks reduced competition by spotting
collusive deviations more easily, by molding railroads into more symmetric groups, by
co-opting maverick railroads, by preventing excess capacity buildup, by increasing multi-
market contact, and by encouraging railroad cross-shareholding. Using data from 1874 to
1913, I show that banker presence was more e↵ective than explicit cartels in extracting
rents and avoiding price or capacity construction wars. The paper estimates that private
banks induced the equivalent of a three player market. I show that the e↵ect of reduced
competition on clients was very significant, in line with the results from MacAvoy (1965),
Porter (1983), and Ellison (1994).
The events around the Armstrong Investigation allow me to quantify what part of
the banker value came from better governance, and what from reduced competition. In
1905, The New York Senate and Assembly opened hearings - the Armstrong Investiga-
tion - of life insurance companies that deeply embarrassed private banks. The Hearings
made it more di cult for private banks to remain involved in the a↵airs of non-financial
corporations and prompted one - Kuhn Loeb - to resign from the board of all non-bank
7Shleifer and Vishny (1986) also develop a model where a large shareholder stake makes a value-adding
takeover more likely.
4
corporations. The empirical results of this paper show that private banks add about 7
percent of corporate value from better firm specific performance, while about 13 percent
of value came from collusive practices. The period under analysis also allows me to study
the value added by four private banks rather than just J.P. Morgan & Co., who has been
analyzed elsewhere and in detail.
The article’s layout is as follows: Section 1 explains how and why private banks took
an active part in the governance of non-financial firms. Section 2 discusses the immediate
historical background surrounding the Armstrong Investigation. Section 3 presents the
evidence of how private banks not only reduced railroad competition but also improved
governance. Section 4 concludes the paper.
1 Reorganizations and Private Bank Control
Before 1890, most railroads and industrial firms were closely held by families or by small
investor groups. Within two decades, American governance was transformed by massive
reorganizations and mergers that allowed banks to control many railroads and industrial
firms. The most important reorganizers were J.P. Morgan & Co. and Kuhn Loeb, who
as private banks were not subject to close government regulation. These corporate re-
organizers were called on to rescue companies in financial distress or to implement large
mergers. Private banks played a triple role as investment bankers, commercial lenders,
and activist institutional investors8.
Reorganizations due to financial distress were common during the 1890s, when one
third of the U.S. railroad trackage fell into bankruptcy. The first bankrupt railroads were
reorganized by J.P. Morgan & Co., and others later by Kuhn Loeb. Reorganizers would
first determine the optimal leverage that a firm could hold. The next step was to reduce
debt to that level, often by impelling creditors to exchange bonds for common stock,
and by forcing old stockholders to inject fresh capital. Finally, private banks used voting
8See Daggett (1908) for an analysis of the Railroad Mergers, and Lamoreaux (1985) for industrial
mergers. James (1983) looks at the technological changes that drove these innovations, dating a significant
structural break after 1880. For private bank regulations, see U.S. Senate Hearings (1933), 25-101; U.S.
Congress (1913), 57-65, 77-80; Carosso (1987), 628.
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trusts to keep absolute control after the reorganization9. Even though private banks had
taken an active role in mergers and reorganizations since 1865, and even though voting
trusts had existed since the 1870s, it was not until the economic collapse in 1893 that
these two elements were blended. Voting trusts allowed private banks to scatter the
company’s equity and keep e↵ective control over managers, in e↵ect creating liquidity
and strong governance. Moody (1919b) describes how and why J.P. Morgan created the
first voting trust:
The control of the properties lay in the voting power of the stock; and,
if voting power could not be controlled, little could be accomplished ... [J.P.
Morgan’s] attempt to reconstruct the Baltimore and Ohio in 1887 was de-
feated entirely because the controlling interests checkmated him by voting his
representative out. He devised a plan whereby he himself would control the
voting power. Before undertaking a reorganization or finding the new capital,
he provided for a ’voting trust,’ a device which, for a number of years, placed
in the hands of a few trustees selected by himself the entire voting power of
the stock. This scheme was followed in the reorganization of the Southern
Railway [in 1893-1894] and was adopted on all later instances. 10
Voting trusts were intended to keep undesirable elements out of the board and to avoid
detrimental policies. When voting trusts expired, usually five years after a reorganization,
private banks kept their partners as members of the firm’s board11. The New York Times
states the reason why Kuhn Loeb & Co. had board positions on railroads:
The members of Kuhn Loeb & Co. are believed to have held places on
railroads principally for the purpose of being informed at first hand of the
a↵airs of the railroads whose securities they were handling in large amounts,
and to be in a position ... to fully protect the interest of their clients who
purchased such securities from them .... Mr. Morgan and his associates are
regarded as taking a much more active part than this in the management of
a number of railroads that have been under Morgan domination.12
9For a detailed description of railroad reorganizations, see Carosso (1987), 363-390; Moody (1918),
29-34. For voting trusts, Carosso (1970), 40-41.
10Moody, 1919b, p. 30. Private banks need not have a large direct position to have a degree of control:
for instance the Armstrong investigation revealed that the Railroad Securities Company (a voting trust
for the Illinois Central) had 12.83% of the available stock (Report of the Joint Committee (1906) pp.
1099 and where the outstanding number of shares as of February 1901 was 600,000, from the New York
Times).
11Voting trusts were also used when no merging party was able to buy the shares from the other firm,
or when one of the parties was unwilling to sell their shares to a former business rival, see Chernow
(1990), 32. Carosso (1987), 368. For more on the mechanics of bank control, see U.S. Senate Hearings
(1933), 54-57; Carosso (1987), 363-369
12March 5, 1905
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Private banks would normally have a small debt and equity position of the firm under
their control. While private bankers could take an equity position in a firm, national com-
mercial banks could not. For this reason, it is likely that private bankers were more active
directors than commercial bankers. Although banker-directors gave managers wide lati-
tude, they intervened forcefully in a few areas, such as dividend and investment policies.
Private banks were interested in retaining a reputation as issuers of safe securities13.
2 The Armstrong Investigation
The involvement of private banks in corporate boards quickly created a political backlash:
Americans traditionally harbored hostility toward monopoly, privilege and
concentrated wealth. In all parts of the country small bankers and business-
men shared the farmers’ antipathy against the great economic changes that
had occurred in the nation since the close of the Civil War. They particularly
feared and distrusted the giant corporate and financial institutions that had
been organized by eastern businessmen and financiers ... The close business
and personal ties that existed among the members of the leading investment
houses, the executives of the companies they served, and the o cers of the
principal financial institutions caused increasing concern to trust-conscious
Americans. The fact that a relatively few banking firms had sponsored most
of the country’s largest corporations emphasized still further the dominance
of a few men over the economy. Most businessmen and financiers were well
aware of the existence of these communities of interest. Not until 1904, how-
ever, did the public generally learn of the informal and subtle nature of these
financial alliances, the extent of their influence, and the profits that were made
in promoting and organizing mergers and consolidations14.
The Armstrong Investigation is rooted in events from the early 1890s, when liberal bank-
ing laws created financial trust companies. Trust companies could invest in more specula-
tive assets than national banks or insurance companies, and for this reason were avoided
by individual investors. Several o cers and directors of life insurance companies saw an
opportunity: they began depositing insurance funds in trust companies and taking out
personal ’loans’ from the life insurance firms to invest in financial trusts on their own
account. By the end of the decade, private banks came into the picture, taking board
13On stakes, U.S. Senate Hearings (1933), 61, 100-101, 390-391, on policy, U.S. Senate Hearings (1933),
3-5, 33, 54-56, 61, 390-395; Carosso (1970), 33
14Carosso (1970), 110-112
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seats in the most prominent life insurance and Trust companies15. For instance, Kuhn
Loeb sat on the board of the Equitable Life Insurance Company, and George Perkins
was both a J.P. Morgan & Co. partner and an executive in the New York Life Insurance
Company. Moody (1919b) suggests that private banks engaged in significant self dealing:
During that remarkable period from 1898 to 1904, ... the assets of the in-
surance companies were handled with steadily increasing recklessness ... Not
only were insurance companies of great strength ’alloted’ abnormally large
amounts of syndicate underwritings ... but their subsidiary trust companies
were also loaded in the same way16.
The immediate event that triggered the Armstrong Investigation was the power struggle
between James W. Alexander and James H. Hyde for the control of the Equitable, a
nominally mutualized insurance company. This struggle created a public uproar that was
further stoked by the belief that private banks had manipulated the Equitable and other
insurance companies for their own personal gains. For instance, managers of the Equitable
Life had personally pocketed all the syndicate profits from wholesaling securities to the
insurance company itself. This practice was known and acquiesced by private banks. In
July 1905, the New York Governor announced a legislative investigation of the matter.
The Hearings, which began on September 6, 1905 and concluded on February 26, 1906,
were held in New York City. John Moody comments:
A sensational insurance investigation which began in 1905 lasted for several
months. Under the direction of Charles E. Hughes, it disclosed to the public
the entire inside history of life insurance finance during the previous decade,
with all its high finance, reckless manipulation of funds, waste, extravagance,
and graft. The result of this investigation was that new and far more stringent
laws were enacted looking to the safeguarding of the assets of policyholders
and the proper investment of insurance funds17.
The investigation also painted an unflattering picture of private banks as directors of
insurance companies. The Hearings disclosed situations where banks had conflicts of
interest, as board members and bankers for these enterprises. Although no wrongdoings
by private banks were uncovered, people were afraid of the potential for mischief:
15Moody (119b), p. 119-128
16Moody (1919b), pp. 129-130
17Moody (1919b), p. 132
8
What disturbed Hughes [the Hearings’ Counsel] and a growing number of
people who read the reports was the almost limitless authority individuals like
Perkins [a J.P. Morgan partner] exercised over the investment policies of the
great life companies. What was there to prevent these men from using their
positions to guarantee their firms a sure, steady market for the securities they
issued? 18
The public perception was that executives were personally enriching themselves at the
expense of policyholders, and in so doing were aided and abetted by bankers. The fol-
lowing excerpt from a speculator turned muckraker is a sample of what was published at
the time:
Under the pretense that is necessary to enable life-insurance companies to
carry out their contracts, two million policy holders are annually tricked into
contributing from their savings sums which not only insure the performance
of these contracts but enable the o cers and trustees - mere servants of the
policyholders - to maintain the most gigantic stock-gambling machine the
world has ever known. Through its operation the companies themselves not
only make and lose millions at single throws of the dice, but the bands of
schemers whose services it is pretended are essential for the transaction of the
life-insurance business filch for themselves huge individual fortunes. Piled on
these excessive charges are additional amounts which enable these tricksters
to maintain palaces, hotels, bars, and every conceivable kind of business, to
pay for armies of lackeys and employees and private servants of o cers and
trustees, and for debauches and banquets which vie with any given by the
kings and queens of the most extravagant and profligate nations on earth;
in addition, enough more to accumulate huge and unnecessary funds - which
are juggled with for the enrichment of individuals. Such wicked exactions
and shameful extravagances constitute an imposition of the most wanton and
criminal character, and those responsible should be be sent to State prison
for life, as too vicious and dangerous to be allowed freedom among an honest
people. I would say further that the trickery and frauds that have been
practiced by the New York Life and the Mutual companies are fully as bad
as, if not worse than, those of the Equitable, now publicly confessed.19
Jacob Schi↵, the senior partner of Kuhn Loeb, testified before the New York Senate on
September 29, 1905. Schi↵ convincingly demonstrated that Kuhn Loeb had not engaged
in self dealing. In first place, even though he had been o↵ered a membership of the
Equitable’s Executive Committee, which decided what securities the Equitable would
invest in, he had not accept it, for it would raise conflicts of interest. From 1900 to 1905,
18Carosso (1970), 122
19Lawson (1906), p. 549
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the Equitable had bought $197 million in securities, out of which only $33 million were
floated by Kuhn Loeb. In that period, Kuhn Loeb had sold $1.36 billion in stocks and
bonds. The Mutual Life - a firm where Kuhn Loeb had no board seat - had meanwhile
bought $42 million, and the New York Life $31 million, so it was not the case that Kuhn
Loeb had become part of the Equitable’s board to exploit it20.
Moreover, Schi↵ expressed serious doubts about the value to private banks of taking
equity stakes and being on the board of non-financial corporations:
The system of directorship in great corporations of the city of New York is such
that a director has practically no power; he is considered, in many instances,
and I may say in most instances, as a negligible quantity by the executive
o cers of the society; he is asked for advice when it suits the executive o cers,
and if under the prevailing system an executive o cer wishes to do wrong or
wishes to conceal anything from his directors or commit irregularities such as
have been disclosed here, the director is entirely powerless, he can only be used
in an advisory capacity and can only judge of such things as are submitted to
him21.
In the testimony, Schi↵ strongly hinted that Kuhn Loeb’s practice of sitting on boards
would no longer continue:
You might say to the directors, you made a mistake to become directors of
the Equitable, and we did. We all learn by experience and I don’t think I will
go in the same system again, or be subjected to the consequences of the same
system22.
In fact, four days after the Hearings concluded, on February 26, 1906, Kuhn Loeb an-
nounced its withdrawal from the boards of all non bank corporations.
In April 1906 the New York legislature forbade insurance companies from underwriting
securities, from buying corporate stock or collateral bonds. Given the importance of New
York State, these regulations a↵ected one of the largest sources of capital at the time.
By 1907, nineteen other states had enacted similar legislation23.
20New York State (1906), p. 1364
21Jacob Schi↵ in New York State (1906), Testimony taken ... pp. 1299
22Schi↵, New York State (1906), pp. 1312-1313
23Carosso (1970) p. 125
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3 How did private banks create value?
On February 26, 1906, Kuhn, Loeb & Co. announced that its partners would resign
from the boards of all the non-bank corporations where they held a seat. This included
insurance companies, steamboat firms, and railroads, among others. The reactions to
the resignation ranged from muted to alarmed. The Wall Street Journal, for example,
commented:
It is not anticipated, in railroad circles, that the resignation of members
of the firm of Kuhn, Loeb & Co. from the directorates of the Pennsylvania
and Harriman lines will a↵ect the policies or financing of these companies ...
the tendency will probably run toward the elimination of relationships that
might even raise the question of ”dual capacity”24
The New York Times on March 5, 1906 mentioned
In connection with the reason assigned by Kuhn Loeb & Co. for their
retirement from railroad boards, it is interesting to recall the statement made
by Jacob H. Schi↵ ... that the average Director was a negligible quantity in
the management of corporations ... The general belief in the financial district
is that the action of Kuhn Loeb & Co. can be directly attributed to the
developments in the insurance investigation... Kuhn Loeb & Co.’s actions
gives special interest to the railroad alliances of other prominent banking
houses ... J.P. Morgan & Co., for instance, ... hold directorates in no less
than sixty two railroad corporations.
The New York Times then produced a list of railroads where J.P. Morgan and other
private banks held board seats. The Commercial and Financial Chronicle was more
worried by this development:
The action of the leading house of Kuhn, Loeb & Co. in deciding that its
partners withdraw from all railroad directorates in which they now hold seat, is
no surprise after the experiences of the past year, and yet it is most regrettable.
If we assume this course followed by all our more prominent banking houses
- a disposition not improbable - the movement would prove highly prejudicial
to best management by our carriers. Moreover, security-holders would be
deprived of the advantage of the most capable men we have for positions
of that kind. There are no other sources for procuring suitable individuals
to fill the places thus vacated. The experiences which have probably led
to this action, and in fact are forcing it, are developments growing out of
24Wall Street Journal, February 27, 1906
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the investigations of corporations, preeminently insurance corporations, which
have been a highly prominent feature among the events of recent months.25
These quotes suggest that it was expected that other private banks would follow Kuhn
Loeb’s actions. Table 1 shows market-traded firms a↵ected by this announcement.
Table 1: NYSE Traded Firms a↵ected by Kuhn Loeb’s Feb. 26, 1906 announcement
Kuhn Loeb & Co. J.P. Morgan & Co. Speyer, Hallgarten & Co. No private bank
Baltimore & Ohio RR Atchison, Topeka, Sta Fe Baltimore & Ohio RR (S) Canadian Pacific RR.
- Chicago Terminal (+) Baltimore & Ohio RR Colorado Southern RR. (H) Chicago Gt. West RR,
- Chesapeake & Ohio (*) Canada Southern RR Rock Island RR (S) Chic, Milwaukee St. Paul RR
- Norfolk & Western (*) Clev., Cinc., Chic. & Southern Pacific RR (S) Chicago & Northwestern RR
- Pennsylvania RR (*) St. Louis RR Toledo St. L. W. RR. (S,H) Delaware Hudson RR.
- Reading RR (*) Erie RR Kansas City Ft. Scott Memph
Chicago & Alton RR New York Central RR Kansas City Southern RR
Denver & Rio Grande RR New York NH & H RR, Louisville & Nashville RR
Northern Securities NY, Ontario & W, RR. Mexican Central RR
- Northern Pacific (+) Northern Securities Minneapolis, St. Paul
- Wisconsin Central (+) - Northern Pacific & Sault Ste. Marie RR.,
- Great Northern (+) - Wisconsin Central Missouri Kansas Texas RR.
Pacific Mail Steamship - Great Northern Missouri Pacific RR.,
Southern Pacific RR Reading RR. Texas Pacific RR.
Railroad Securities Co. Southern Railway Wabash RR.
- Illinois Central RR (+)
Union Pacific RR
Non-competitors with
Morgan & Co. Director
General Electric
U.S. Steel
Western Union
Source: New York Times, March 5, 1906. Note: Speyer was also on the Board of Mexican National RR, although this
was controlled by Weetman Pearson, not by American capital. (*) Have significant stakes in firms a↵ected by the event,
although Kuhn Loeb partners are not in the board. (+) Controlled by firm where Kuhn Loeb has a board seat. (S) Has a
Speyer board member, (H) has a Hallgarten board member.
To investigate whether Kuhn Loeb added value by reducing competition among rail-
roads, I identified the competitors of Kuhn Loeb represented firms26. Note that some of
25Commercial and Financial Chronicle, March 3, 1906, p. 476.
26Table 1 shows that there were 15 actively traded firms that were directly a↵ected by their an-
nouncement. Kuhn Loeb had a directorship in the Baltimore and Ohio railroad, which was part of the
Pennsylvania Railroad ”community of interest”. I include the other railroads in that ”community of inter-
est” to account for any possible cross shareholdings they may have had. The Commercial and Financial
Chronicle and Wall Street Journal thought it likely that other private banks would follow Kuhn Loeb,
while the New York Times found this event unlikely, at least for J.P. Morgan. The methodology for se-
lecting competitors is as follows: For railroads, the competitors are taken to be those in the same region
as defined by the ICC. See Haney (1924) for more on this issue. At the time, the Baltimore and Ohio
was controlled by the Pennsylvania, as Moody (1919a, p. 115) shows. The exclusion of the Pennsylvania
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these competitors also had a private bank as a board member, and that a few private
bank represented firms (General Electric, U.S. Steel, and Western Union) were not com-
petitors of Kuhn Loeb represented firms. To further explore the e↵ects of private banks
on competition, I identified railroad clients and suppliers. I identified as clients those
firms who were heavy transport users and as suppliers those companies that sold railroad
equipment and the like. Steel companies are not used in this part of the analysis since it
is di cult to settle now whether they are clients or suppliers. Table 2 shows the list of
market traded clients, suppliers and steel companies.
Table 2: Clients and Suppliers a↵ected by Kuhn Loeb announcement
Railroad Clients Railroad Suppliers Steel Companies
American Cotton Oil American Car & Foundry Colorado Fuel & Iron
American Can American Locomotive Republic Steel & Iron
American Sugar Refining Pressed Steel Car Sloss She eld Steel
Corn Products Tennessee Coal & Iron
Distillers Securities U.S. Steel
National Biscuit Co.
National Lead
Virginia Carolina Chemicals
Sources: For clients, Chandler (1976), p. 327, 328, 336, 328, 355. For suppliers, Chandler (1977), p. 359.
Notice that National Lead produced chemical compounds rather than lead products
3.1 Portfolio Time Series Results
Kuhn Loeb’s announcement can be studied using the event study methodology, which
assumes that stock returns follow a standard market model27. I created the following non
overlapping equally weighted portfolios:
• KL: the portfolio of 15 railroads with a Kuhn Loeb board member.
RR from the portfolio yields very similar results quantitatively and qualitatively. The Baltimore and
Ohio also controlled the Reading Railroad as Moody (1919, p117) points out. The Railroad Securities
Company was a voting trust for the Illinois Central (Armstrong Investigation p. 1101). Finally, the
Wisconsin Central RR. was part of the Northern Pacific (see Chandler 1977, p. 168).
27Returns are assumed to follow a process rit = ↵i+ irmt+✏it ✏it ⇠ N(0, 2i ), where rit is the return
of a stock or a portfolio of stocks, rmt is the market return, and ✏it is an error term. To calculate the
↵i and  i, parameters, I used the monthly returns of 71 actively traded corporations in the New York
and Curb Stock Exchanges between February 1900 and August 1905. The market return is defined as
an equally weighted portfolio of these 71 actively traded firms. For a detailed analysis of the event study
methodology, consult Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay (1997), Chapter 4.
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• PB : the portfolio of 11 railroads that competed with KL, with other private bank
as a board member28.
• CKL: the portfolio of 14 railroads that competed with KL and had no private
banker on its board.
• Client: the portfolio of 9 railroad client firms.
• Supplier: the portfolio of 3 railroad supplier companies.
• PBI: the portfolio of 3 industrial companies with a private bank as director.
The cumulative abnormal return (CAR) is the sum of forecast errors for the period
surrounding the announcement:
CARid =
k+dX
s=k+1
(ris   [b↵i + b irms]) (1)
The event window begins on September 27, 1905 before Jacob Schi↵’s testimony, and
concludes on February 28, 1906, after Kuhn Loeb’s announcement. I also calculate the
abnormal returns until April 17, 1906 - the day before the San Francisco Earthquake -
to see if any of these e↵ects were temporary or not. Table 3 shows that the impact of
the news had been digested by December 31, 1905 and that investors interpreted Jacob
Schi↵’s testimony on September 29, 1905 as a farewell to Kuhn Loeb’s governance of
non-bank corporations.
The portfolio of railroads with a Kuhn Loeb partner on its board fell significantly,
namely 9.1% or 9.9%, depending on whether the cuto↵ date is December 1905 or April
1906. Railroad competitors with some other private bank board member also fell signifi-
cantly, anywhere from 13.6% and 13.0%, depending on the cuto↵ date. One cannot reject
the hypothesis that the Kuhn Loeb and private bank portfolios dropped equally29. The
portfolio of railroad competitors without a private bank on its board also fell significantly,
28Note that at the time the Northern Pacific was controlled by both Kuhn Loeb and by J.P. Morgan
& Co., but I assign it exclusively to the Kuhn Loeb portfolio- I do a cross section estimate below to
disentangle any concurrent status of a given company. The results do not change.
29The portfolio shorting one and holding the other yields a t-stat of 0.5359 as of April 17, 1906
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Table 3: Cumulative Abnormal Returns for a↵ected Portfolios
Portfolio: KL PB CKL Clients Suppliers PBI
9/27/1905 value value value value value value
To: (t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat)
10/31/1905 -2.7068 -0.7051 -2.5946 4.4691 14.7693 -1.2376
(1.5891) (0.3456) (1.3286) (1.3103) (2.3109) (0.3827)
12/31/1905 -9.0750 -13.5716 -7.3061 24.1604 11.4175 -3.7933
(3.0250) (3.7772) (2.1241) (4.0219) (1.0143) (0.6660)
2/28/1906 -7.9730 -11.3402 -7.6688 19.3338 12.2898 -4.4111
(2.0353) (2.4171) (1.7075) (2.4648) (0.8361) (0.5931)
4/17/1906 -9.9172 -13.0236 -10.7269 25.5050 11.9504 -4.9630
(2.1974) (2.4094) (2.0731) (2.8222) (0.7057) (0.5792)
KL: Portfolio of firms with Kuhn Loeb director PB: Portfolio of competitors of KL with another private
bank director CKL: Competitors of KL, excludes firms in PB. Clients: Portfolio of railroad users
Suppliers: Portfolio of railroad suppliers. PBI: portfolio of industrial firms with a private bank director.
The market return is computed using an equally weighted return of all actively traded firms (71 firms).
The standard error formula is corrected for an error in variables estimation of the benchmark period.
anywhere from 7.3% and 10.7%, depending on the cuto↵ date. This is statistically the
same as the fall of railroads with a private banker board member 30. Railroad clients
benefited greatly, with a positive CARi between 24.2% and 25.5%, depending on the
cuto↵ date. Figure 1 shows the evolution of these cumulative abnormal returns. The
other portfolios had no statistically significant changes.
The results suggest that around the time of the Armstrong Investigation and the
Kuhn Loeb resignation there was a shock that damaged all railroads similarly, regardless
of their board composition. Given that Kuhn Loeb resigned from all boards, we can also
rule out Cantillo’s (1998) signalling hypothesis, whereby the fall in price resulted from
the negative information of the firm being abandoned, and positive information of the
firms being retained. This shock also benefited railroad clients significantly, consistent
with the hypothesis that private banks weakened competition. If so, railroads without
private bank directors were simply free riding on a cooperative industrial arrangement
engineered by private banks. Another way to measure the governance e↵ect of private
banks is to look at the portfolio of industrial firms with a Morgan director. This portfolio
fell by 3.78% to 4.94%, but not in a statistically significant way. The portfolio results
suggest that private banks did not add di↵erential value relative to peer railroads, and
that there is no great social loss from throwing them out of the boards. This conclusion
30The portfolio shorting one and holding the other yields a t-stat of 0.0702 as of April 17, 1906
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will be tempered when we look at individual cross-sectional returns.
Figure 1: CARs for a↵ected firm portfolios
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The dramatic e↵ect on railroad clients is coherent with results from MacAvoy (1965),
who found that prices in a ’price war’ season where on average 24.12% lower than the
previous comparable ’cooperative’ season, with the mildest drop being 8.24% and the
most severe breakdown leading to a 42.87% price drop. Porter (1983) studied railroad
cartels from 1880 to 1886, and fitting his results into a structural model, found that a
price war translated into a 40% drop in prices31.
Railroad suppliers had a positive but statistically insignificant reaction, with a CARi
between 11.4% and 12.0%, depending on the cuto↵ date. However, this is statistically
significant only the first month after Schi↵’s testimony.
3.2 Private Banks and Railroad Competition: 1874-1913
So far, the results suggest that practically all the value of banker-directors came from
reducing competition. To study this issue further, I will now use observable outcomes
31Lamoreaux (1985) documents how the nail industry was able to raise prices by 60% in 1895, to be
followed by a 64% price collapse in 1896. She also documents American Sugar Refining was better able
to extract rebates from railroads during price wars.
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rather than cartel agreements that became di cult to spot after the Sherman Act was
passed.
To proxy for transport costs, Table 4 shows the average price di↵erentials of hard
wheat for four city pairs: New York - Chicago, Liverpool - New York, Liverpool - Chicago,
and Liverpool - Odessa. Odessa was the gateway for the Black Sea wheat, the main com-
petitor for American wheat exports. Liverpool was the access point to the biggest wheat
consumer market at the time. The price di↵erentials are taken as a proxy for transport
costs, either steamboat-railroad costs for the New York-Chicago price di↵erentials, ocean
rates for port cities price di↵erentials, and a composite transport cost for the Liverpool-
Chicago price di↵erential32. The periods studied are 1879 to 1893, a period when private
banks took no board seats in U.S. railroads, and from 1894 to 1906 when private banks
took on a more activist role in railroad boards.
Table 4: Hard Wheat Price Di↵erentials, in gold dollar cents
City Pairs 1879-1893 1894-1906
New York - Chicago Average Di↵erential 10.2 10.0
Standard Deviation 11.4 8.7
Liverpool - New York Average Di↵erential 11.8 3.1
Standard Deviation 4.3 5.5
Liverpool - Chicago Average Di↵erential 22.0 13.1
Standard Deviation 13.0 8.5
Liverpool - Odessa Average Di↵erential 19.1 13.7
Standard Deviation 7.7 5.9
Source: Harley (1980), Appendix Table, and MacAvoy (1965). This uses term averages. Odessa had a
slight cost advantage over Chicago of 7.3 cents in the first period, and of 10.6 cents in the second period.
A number of facts emerge from Table 4. First, the transport costs for the New
York - Chicago routes are more stable in the second period - when private banks were
directors - than in the first period33. The second observation is that the Chicago to New
York transport costs dropped by a mere 1.64% while all the other transport costs fell
dramatically (74% for the Liverpool-New York di↵erentials, and 28% for the Liverpool-
Odessa). This is clearly not due only to an improvement of ocean transport productivity,
32For this, I assume that all the wheat in New York came from within the US or Canada. In fact,
from 1871 to 1906 there were three years when the Odessa prices were extremely low, and when the New
York price fell below the Chicago price, a definite anomaly.
33However, this di↵erence in variance is not statistically significant, with an F test of F25,29 = 0.76,
with a critical value at the 5% confidence of 1.92
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since we would have had a more proportional drop in both ocean routes. The third fact
is that the New York - Chicago di↵erential captures 76.47% of the Liverpool-Chicago
transport costs in the second period versus only 46.21% in the first period. All these
facts are consistent with the hypothesis that private banks softened competition among
railroads, in this case the Chicago to New York routes34. How could banks do this?
To begin with, private bankers doubted the value of competition. A Morgan partner
testified at the Pujo Hearings in 1912 that: ”The old idea that we were raised under,
that competition is the life of trade, is exploded. Competition is no longer the life of
trade, it is cooperation”35. In creating U.S. Steel in 1901, International Harvester, and
the International Mercantile Marine (IMM) in 1902, J.P. Morgan & Co. made the explicit
point of creating firms with well over half of the market share of their segments. J.P.
Morgan & Co. refused to help in the Consolidated Steel and Wire merger because they
believed it was inherently unstable, and J.W. Gates, a Morgan partner said about this
merger that “Some arrangement whereby prices can be maintained is absolutely essential
to success”36.
The railroad industry was a key sector where competition and collusion regularly
clashed. Cartels arose almost as soon as the railroads themselves. MacAvoy (1965)
studied the Trunk-Line Cartels from 1871 to 1899. Of the 57 terms analyzed, he found
that 24 corresponded to a price war37. Porter (1983) and Ellison (1994) studied weekly
prices from 1880 to 1886. They found that during ’cooperative’ periods, railroad rates
were close to their monopoly prices, and that during price wars the values dropped, either
34This would mean that New York City paid for the higher transport costs if we assumed that the
ocean freight and wheat production were competitive. Harley (1980), Table 2 documents that railroads
gave a rebate to wheat shipments meant for export, which is evidence that railroads had some market
power, and that the Liverpool was a more competitive venue than New York.
35Pujo Hearings (1912), 1019. Morgan’s declarations on competition are reprinted in the Wall Street
Journal, December 20, 1912. Chandler (1977), 317-319. They were not alone, as some respectable
economists in the American Economic Association had embraced ”German” school of economic policy
regarding competition. For an in depth discussion, consult Letwin (1965) pp. 71-77. Carosso (1970),
138. By the way, private banks were not alone in distrusting competition. For instance, the American
Economic Association was very ambivalent at the time that the Sherman Act was passed (See Letwin
(1965), pp. 72-73
36On the monopolizing nature of the IMM, see Chernow (1990), 100-101, and Carosso (1987), 482-483.
On the Steel and Wire merger, Lamoreaux (1985) p. 73
37There are seven price wars during the period, and its the average duration was was about 21 months
Whether these price wars were an equilibrium or an o↵-equilibrium responses is studied by Porter (1984)
and Ellison (1994).
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to a Cournot or to a Bertrand equilibrium, depending on the econometric model used.
MacAvoy found that the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) in 1887 made collusion
more sustainable, and that Court decisions beginning in 1893 that weakened the ICC’s
power again destabilized cartels. Cartels did not work very well because they could not
engage maverick or weakened railroads, and because of changes in demand.
When private banks began reorganizing railroads in the 1880s, they were mostly con-
cerned about guaranteeing the soundness of the securities they sold. Morgan and Kuhn
Loeb’s experience in the railroad industry had shown them that price competition desta-
bilized the industry and cash flows promised by the instruments that they had floated.
To counter this, private banks first tried persuasion as this 1886 newspaper article shows:
Anthracite Coal Combination: Representatives of the various coal [Rail-
road] companies met at the house of Mr. J. Pierpont Morgan this week, and
informally decided to limit coal production and maintain prices ... Mr. Mor-
gan recognized the value of the monopoly element when acquiring control of
and consolidating coal fields of Pennsylvania38.
Private banks suggestions gained more weight after the 1894 reorganizations gave them
board seats.
Private banks lobbied hard for their positions. This letter by President Theodore
Roosevelt reflects on the calls by bankers to tone down his antitrust policy around the
time of the Northern Securities Case:
I am very fond of George Perkins ... But, to be perfectly frank, he did not
appear to advantage in the talk he had with me on the evening in question ...
He was occupying exactly the same attitude that Bob Bacon occupies on this
question, and of Bob Bacon I am even fonder. Both of them are men of the
highest character, who are genuine forces for good as well as men of strength
and weight. But on this particular occasion they were arguing like attorneys
for a bad case, and at the bottom of their hearts each would know this if he
were not personally interested; and especially, if he were not the representative
of a man so strong and dominant a character as Pierpont Morgan. In plain
38Commercial and Financial Chronicle, 3/27/1886, cited in Moody (1904), p. 443. In the end, Mor-
gan convinced the presidents and tra c managers of the Philadelphia & Reading, the Delaware, the
Lackawanna & Western, the Lehigh Valley, and the Delaware and Hudson railroads to ”manage” the an-
thracite coal tra c. Chandler (1977) believed that banks gave up on their attempts to cartelize after the
Sherman Act was enacted in 1890. However, it was not until 1897 (in United States v. Trans-Missouri
Freight Ass’n) that the Supreme Court settled the illegality of railroad cartels. Moreover, Posner and
Easterbrook (1981, p. 100) argue that railroads continued to fix prices after 1898.
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English, what Perkins wanted me to do was to go back on my messages ... I
intend to be most conservative, but in the interests of the big corporations
themselves and above all in the interest of the country I intend to pursue,
cautiously but steadily, the course to which I have been publicly committed
again and again, and which I am certain is the right course. I may add that
I happen to know that President McKinley was uneasy about this so-called
trust question and was reflecting in his mind what he should do in the matter.
Perkins wanted me to do nothing at all, and say nothing except platitudes.39
By 1900, banks looked for other ways to reduce railroad competition. Private banks
encouraged Eastern railways to make ”communities of interest”, where large railroads
took a non-controlling minority stake in smaller competitors40. Stigler (1964) argued
that two factors that sustained collusion are e↵ective enforcement of the agreed terms
and a small number of symmetric sellers. The communities of interest engineered by
private banks increased concentration and reduced asymmetry by embracing straggling
small railroads into wider alliances. The e↵ect of cross shareholding as a way to enhance
’coordinated e↵ects’ is well understood by antitrust authorities.41 These communities of
interest waned because of strong public disapproval, as noted by Moody (1919a):
These and other purchases, and the consequent voice acquired in the man-
agement, established comparative harmony among Eastern railroads for a long
time; they stabilized rates and enabled formerly competing roads to parcel out
territory equitably among the di↵erent interests”
The American public ... believed that the ”community of interest” plan
was merely a scheme to defeat the Interstate Commerce Act and the Sherman
Act and to maintain secretly all the old railroad abuses.42
Communities of interest were eventually dissolved, but the idea that private banks took
control only to reduce competition remained43.
39
Roosevelt letters III, 159f, quoted in Letwin (1965), p. 204
40Among industrial corporations, this was practiced in the Gunpowder Trade Association, for example,
Lamoreaux, p. 101
41ICN (2006) Merger Guidelines, p. 48: ’if a firm has equity participation in a competitor, the scope
for collusion may be enhanced. Links between competitors can make it easier to coordinate pricing and
marketing policies, or to exchange information on these matters. Also, incentives to compete might be
reduced in such cases given that the financial performance of the firm is a↵ected by the profits of the
competitor in which the firm has participation.’
42Moody (1919a, p. 44, 116)
43Moreover, this reduced competition worked not only among railroads. For example, North (1954)
states: ”Following the railroad reorganizations the investment banker turned to the consolidation of
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Multimarket contact is another factor that helps collusion, as proven theoretically by
Bernheim and Whinston (1990)44. Empirical studies using that framework have found
that greater multimarket contact raises prices in the airline, hotel, and mobile phone
industries (Evans and Kessides 1994, Fernandez and Mar´ın 1998, Parker and Roller 1997).
Private banks represented railroads in every region, so multimarket contact widened and
became prevalent.
Another element that helped sustain collusion was a lower debt level and familiar-
ity with one’s competitors45. Lowered debt was one of the consequences of the 1894
reorganizations.
Among railroads west of the Mississippi, a very important factor limiting competition
was construction restraint. The value of such control was shown theoretically by Kreps
and Scheinkman (1983). Harley (1982) studied collusion among railroads by examining
the trackage construction in western states. He shows that in this region, railroads were
able to coordinate and not build ahead of demand until the late 1870s. However, by 1883,
this understanding had broken down, with specially acute capacity buildup in 1886 and
1887. Harley (1982) argues that the construction peaks in 1871, 1882, and 1887, have
no relationship to economic activity but rather to a breakdown in cooperation. Private
banks were well positioned to observe and act on railroad construction, as they normally
handled or underwrote the security issues not only of the railroad systems where they
had a board member, but of other systems as well46. For example, In 1889, the Eastern
Trunk line and the Southern Railway and Steamship associations developed as cartels
that tried to enforce the rates and allocate tra c, but
When the Southwestern Association failed to do the same, Morgan brought
the presidents or general mangers of leading western roads and representatives
other fields of transport and industry in order that competition might be eliminated from these fields as
well and the security-holder guaranteed a safe return on his investment” North (1954), p. 213. Moody
(1919b), pp. 110-111 for example mentions the failed attempt to cut the competition among transatlantic
companies.
44This is embedded in competition authorities best practices, see ICN (2006), p. 49
45Lamoreaux 1985, pp. 58-59
46The New York Times, in discussing Kuhn Loeb’s resignation announcement, mentioned that this
private bank handled the security issues of Gould’s railroads, even if this created some conflict of interest
because of their membership in the board of the Southern Pacific railroad. cfr. New York Times, March
5, 1906
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of leading banks to a series of meetings in New York. At these meetings the
Western Association was formed, this association agreed to follow the lead of
other associations. At the same time Morgan emphasized his determination to
discipline competitive construction as well as competitive rate making.47
Construction statistics show that in fact railroad construction growth dropped from 4.6%
in 1874-1893 to 1.76% in 1894-1913, when bankers took board seats. However, this result
is most likely due to network saturation.
To study the issue with a better control, I compare the growth rates of railroad
mileage in Western Canada and the United States Northwest railroad region. Table 5
shows the averages and standard deviations for the growth series of Western Canada and
Northwestern United States. The western Canadian railroads had no private bankers as
directors during the whole period, and their annual mileage growth rate did drop from
7.42% in 1874-1893 to 3.51% in 1894-1913. Meanwhile, the Northwestern U.S. mileage
dropped more steeply, from 6.81% in 1874-1893 to 2.11% in 1894-1913.
Table 5: Growth In Western Canada and Northwestern U.S.
Period 1874-1893 1874-1893 1894-1913 1894-1913
Sample moments: xi  i xi  i
Industrial Production, U.S. 4.73% 7.06% 4.66% 8.61%
Mileage growth, Northwest U.S. 6.81% 4.77% 2.11% 1.11%
Mileage growth, Western Canada 7.42% 3.82% 3.51% 1.84%
Sources: industrial production: Davis (2004); mileage growth: Harley (1980).
We cannot reject the hypothesis that the series have the same means and variances
for the 1874-1893 periods, while for the 1894-1913 period we can reject those hypotheses
at the 5% confidence48. In other words, construction in the Northwestern United States
slowed significantly and was much more stable relative to its Canadian counterpart, in
spite of equivalent growth and volatility of industrial production in both periods. These
results are consistent with the hypothesis that private banks were able to prevent com-
petitive capacity construction. Figure 2 shows that Canadian railroads did experience
construction booms after 1894, an event that never again occurred in the Northwestern
47Chandler (1977), p. 171, bold letters are mine
48F-test for the means was 4.1207, and for the variances was 4.2329. The critical value for the t-test
of sample means is 2.093, and for the F-test of variances is 2.168, see Hogg and Ledolter (1987)
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United States. It is possible, of course, that both regions were no longer comparable in
the 1894-1913 period, but this is unlikely.
Figure 2: Railroad mileage growth in Western North America
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Source: Harley (1980). States for the U.S. are those that belong to the ICC’s Northwest-
ern Region, see Haney (1924), Figure 20.
3.3 Cross Sectional analysis
The portfolio analysis has shed much light about private banks, but it also has thrown
away important company specific information. Kuhn Loeb’s announcement was massive,
a↵ecting at least 50 firms in complex ways. To disentangle these e↵ects, it is better to
run a multivariate regression, and to better do so, we must first recall our findings.
Bank involvement has two potential e↵ects. First, it lowers the probability of a price
war in an industry j, pj, so that all firms in said industry j are close to their collusive
value qi, whether they have a private bank on their board or not. Private banks can also
a↵ect corporate value at a particular firm i beyond the collusive e↵ect. It would reduce
value if it engaged in self dealing, and raise it if it improved the level, growth, or safety
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of equityholder cash flows. Firm value in an industry pacified by banks is given by:
vi = (1 +  Bi)qi
Here, I assume that the probability of a price war pj is nil. Bi is an indicator function
that takes a value of one if the firm has a private bank in its board. The parameter  
measures the governance improvement (if positive) or the rent extraction (if negative)
caused by the bank’s board membership.
If a private bank abandons an industry j, it will increase the probability pj(Yj) of
a price war. The probability of a price war depends on industry characteristics Yj such
as market concentration, barriers to entry, etc. If a price war occurs, it will a↵ect all
firms in that industry. The new collusive value for each firm is q0i ⌘ qi⌘i, where ⌘i(Zi)
reflects the specific natural defenses or weaknesses that a firm has once banks are gone.
Examples of such natural defenses Zi are ”community of interest” cross-shareholdings or
natural multimarket presence. Suppose that if there is a price war, the firm will lose !
percent of its collusive value. The expected value of a firm i in industryj that has been
left behind by private banks is:
v0i = (1  pj)q0i + pj(1  !)q0i = [1  pj!]qi⌘i
The returns are then given by:
ri = ln[
v0i
vi
] = ln[1  p(Yj)!] + ln[⌘(Zi)]  ln[1 +  Bi] (2)
ri '  0 +  0yYj +  0zZi +   Bi + "i (3)
In other words, we can decompose returns in three parts. The first considers the
industry variables that a↵ect the likelihood of a price war. The second includes the
individual characteristics that protect a firm once private banks are gone. The third
e↵ect is how bank board membership changes a firm’s performance beyond its competitive
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e↵ect. The economteric implementation of equation (3) runs cumulative abnormal returns
as a linear function of di↵erent firm or industry attributes:
CARi =  
0Xi +  i  i ⇠ N(0,  2i ) i = 1, 2, ..., 70 (4)
where CARi is calculated from September 26, 1905 to December 31, 190549, or through
to April 17, 1906. Xi represents a vector of corporate or industry attributes.
Table 6: Railroad Markets and Concentration
Western Markets HHI Top 4 Eastern Markets HHI Top 4
Northern Transcontinental 1970 88% New England 2716 83%
Granger Route 1801 69% Trunk Line 1362 69%
Southwestern Route 1763 68% Coal Railroads 2368 89%
Rocky Mountains 2829 90% Chicago Southeast 1979 81%
Central Transcontinental 3557 90% Atlantic Coast, South 3135 90%
Southern Transcontinental 1626 76% Mississippi Valley 2063 78%
Pacific Coast 2714 85%
Source: Haney (1924) definition of relevant markets. Poors (1903) mileage for all railroads with over 100
miles. The Rocky Mountains Market spans the triangle of Ogden UT, Cheyenne WY, and Santa Fe NM.
The HHI Index is calculated as if all railroads below 100 miles are atomized. For railroads in multiple
markets, I use a weighted average (by miles) of each market’s HHI and Top 4 measure.
The first variable is whether a firm belongs to a market a↵ected by the announcement,
i.e., North American railroads. To refine this classification further, I identified in Table
6 the di↵erent relevant markets as defined by Haney (1924). I estimated the Herfindahl-
Hirschmann Index for each market, using railroad mileage as the metric of market share,
and drawing the data from Poor’s Manual of Railroads (1903) for all railroads over 100
miles, traded or not. The hypothesis is that if private bankers helped firms collude,
then their departure would be more damaging for railroads in low concentration markets,
where tacit collusion would be harder to sustain. Figure 3 shows a simple correlation
between the HHIj and CARi up to April 17, 190650. The equation crosses the x axis at
an HHIj =
29.62
0.0096 = 3085. At this level, roughly equivalent to a market with three equal
railroads, banker presence would have no di↵erential impact. Private banks sat on the
49I used this three month window because the results in the the event study show that the information
was absorbed by December 31, 1905.
50The result is statistically significant, at F1,39 = 10.57 with a critical value at the 5% of 4.08. The
value remains significant if we exclude the two railroads that operate only in the Rocky Mountains,
Denver and Rio Grande and Colorado Southern, who seem like an outlier. The result also follows if we
regress the top 4 market share.
25
board of railroads whose average HHI was 1678, slightly below the average industry HHI
of 1955. This makes sense, as private banks would enter where they could add most value
or prevent the most serious price wars. Firms in less concentrated markets were also more
likely to have gone bankrupt and to need reorganizing after the 1893 Depression.
Figure 3: CAR as of April 17, 1906 versus Herfindahl Hirschmann Index
y = 0.0096x - 29.62
R2 = 0.2133
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Source: Harley (1980). States for the U.S. are those that belong to the ICC’s Northwest-
ern Region, see Haney (1924), Figure 20.
To test the hypothesis that cross shareholding blunted competition, I created a dummy
set to 1 when a railroad had significant ownership of (over 5%), or was partly owned by
another railroad. The data is obtained from Poor’s Manual of Railroads of 1903. To
test the hypothesis that multimarket presence weakened competition, I created a dummy
variable if the railroad spanned several markets.
An important attribute for the regression is whether a firm had a private bank as a
board member51. This will be used to estimate if private banks created value beyond the
competitive e↵ects mentioned before.
For those firms not directly a↵ected by the announcement, I included a dummy of
51Table 1 shows that some railroads had several private banks in their board. I can individually
partition the firms by each private bank, although the results are qualitatively the same.
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whether a firm is a client or supplier of the railroads a↵ected by this announcement. Steel
companies were identified as clients, since the dummy estimates (not presented here) were
always statistically equivalent to the client dummy, and statistically di↵erent from the
supplier dummy.
Finally, to disentangle any sector specific shocks, I used a dummy for U.S. railroads52.
The Hepburn Act was passed on June 29, 1906. This Bill enhanced the Interstate Com-
merce Commission’s powers to set railroad rates, and may have a↵ected the U.S. railroad
returns at this stage.
As a robustness check, I calculated a market adjusted return (MARi = ri   rm) to
control for any possible misspecification or error in variables biases. Table 7 shows the
results. The dependent variable in the first two columns are the adjusted returns from
September 26, 1905 to December 31st, 1905. The last two columns show the regressions
for the longer event window going from September 26, 1905 to April 17th, 1906.
The results on the U.S. Railroad variable suggest that the Hepburn Act did not have
any strong or predictable e↵ect at this time. It also rules out the hypothesis that this
event was driven by some regulatory or sector specific shock unrelated to Kuhn Loeb’s
announcement.
As with the portfolio time series, we can see that railroad suppliers benefited from
this announcement, but not in a statistically significant way except in one case. Railroad
clients did benefit greatly and in a statistically significant way from the announcement.
Railroad clients had adjusted returns between 15 and 25 percent. The size of these
jumps is consistent with price drops of the unstable cartels prior to the Sherman Act, as
documented by MacAvoy (1965).
The first natural defense for a railroad are ”community of interest”cross-shareholdings.
This variable is always positive and mostly significant at the 95% confidence. The point
estimates say that cross shareholdings softened the drop by 6.5% to 9.2%, and confirms
Moody’s conjecture that ”communities of interest” weakened competition significantly.
52We are lucky to have several Canadian and Mexican railroads, and some American steamship that
were a↵ected by the announcement but not directly subject to the regulatory shock. In fact, from April
1906 onwards, we can detect a shock that a↵ected American railroads.
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Table 7: The Cross-Sectional Impact of Kuhn Loeb Retirement on Firms’CARi
Model Name CAR3 MAR3 CAR7 MAR7
Start Date 9/27/1905 9/27/1905 9/27/1905 9/27/1905
End Date 12/31/1905 12/31/1905 4/17/1906 4/17/1906
Dependent Variable CARi MARi CARi MARi
No. Observations 71 71 71 71
R2 0.4505 0.4108 0.4184 0.3800
Adjusted R2 0.3796 0.3348 0.3434 0.3000
Variable coe cient coe cient coe cient coe cient
(t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat)
Constant 7.7062 4.8122 3.4193 0.3562
(1.2723) (0.7499) (0.5205) (0.0530)
Market Player -23.5294 -21.8014 -35.9965 -36.8091
(2.8358) (2.6921) (3.1721) (3.2196)
Market Concentration (HHI) 0.0071 0.0074 0.0117 0.0126
(2.9522) (3.1356) (3.8071) (4.3297)
Railroad Cross-shareholding 6.7352 6.7173 6.5080 9.1923
(2.2706) (2.4792) (1.9179) (3.0162)
Multimarket Presence -5.9524 -5.9313 -2.4450 -1.9569
(1.9804) (1.9595) (0.7867) (0.6174)
Private Bank in Board -7.1471 -7.0935 -5.6325 -6.7181
(2.3971) (2.5727) (1.6212) (2.0894)
Railroad Client 14.5538 15.9157 23.2473 20.5733
(1.8818) (2.0343) (2.3803) (2.2920)
Railroad Supplier 4.2308 9.0339 9.8987 14.0510
(0.5012) (1.0963) (1.3122) (2.0791)
U.S. Railroads -4.4702 -2.8753 1.3453 5.0535
(1.2479) (0.9173) (0.2340) (0.8491)
All t-statistics use heteroskedastic consistent standard errors. CARid =
Pk+d
s=k+1(ris   [b↵i + b irms]) and
MARid =
Pk+d
s=k+1(ris   rms)
The other railroad characteristic to guard o↵ competition without a private bank, i.e.,
multimarket contacts, did not soften but intensify competition. The point estimates are
between 2.0% and 6.0%. However, half of the multimarket contact estimates are statis-
tically insignificant, so it may be idle to conjecture the reasons behind this unexpected
sign.
What was the value of banker directors? The econometric model allows us to estimate
the value from reduced competition and from firm specific improvements, that I will
henceforth call better governance. Table 7 shows that all players in the market were
a↵ected, with highly fragmented railroad markets being the most vulnerable. We can
calculate the HHIj at which the announcement had no competitive impact. We will call
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this the artificial HHI created by bank specific facilitating practices. Using the average
HHI of 1678 for bank represented railways, we can infer the value generated by collusion.
For example, using the first regression estimates, bank induced collusive practices added
a value of zcollusion = 23.5294  0.0071⇥ 1678 = 11.61%, while a bank board seat added
a railroad-specific value of 7.15%, or about 41% of the total value. Table 8 summarizes
the results for the di↵erent sources of value. Table 8 also combines the regression results
with equation (2) to infer the value ! destroyed in a price war53.
Table 8: Sources of Private Bank Value Added
Model CAR3 MAR3 CAR7 MAR7
Average HHI of railroad with Private Bank 1678 1678 1678 1678
Equivalent HHI with Private Bank 3311 2941 3088 2929
Gains from facilitating practices (% of value) 11.61 9.36 16.44 15.72
Firm specific gains (% value) 7.15 7.09 5.63⇤ 6.72
Total Gains 18.75 16.46 22.07 22.44
% from better governance 38 43 26⇤ 30
Estimated !, value lost in price war % 31 26 43 42
⇤ means this is not statistically significant
On average, private banks added about 20% of value by being on a board. About
13.3% of that value was due to practices that facilitated collusion not only among railroads
represented by banks, but by their competitors. About 6.7% of value came from better
governance. Both sources of value are consistently estimated. The collusion results are
always statistically significant, and the governance results are all significant at the 95%
confidence in all but one case. There was no significant di↵erence due to a specific private
bank, i.e, Morgan represented railroads did not fall more than, say, Speyer represented
railroads. These results contrast with Schi↵’s assertion that private bank directors were
’neglible quantities’. In fact, the New York Times ran an article on October 3, 1905
entitled ”Directors do Direct, These Financiers Say” . It quoted, among others, Dumont
Clarke, then the President of the American Exchange National Bank, who said:
The director can at least judge the honesty and e ciency of those to whom
he delegates power, and he has the means at his command to right a situation
53To identify this number, I use MacAvoy’s results about the Trunk Line Cartels, were he found the
frequency of price war without banks was pj(HHIj = 1362) =
24
57 = 0.4211, i.e. 24 terms out of 57
studied.
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that does not meet his approval.
The results on value added by banks are higher than Cantillo’s (1998) - who estimated
that a banker director in 1914 added value from 6.76% to 7.96%; his results are in turn
higher than DeLong and Ramirez’s (1995) study of bank directorships in 1939. These
numbers soundly refute those who argued that bank control destroyed corporate value
by self dealing. The decline of banker directors’ value could be ascribed to: 1) more
stringent corporate governance legislation that restricted private bank involvement, 2)
more e↵ective antitrust legislation that blunted banks’ devices to reduce competition, 3)
more complex company structures that sharpened the asymmetric information problems
faced by outside directors. Becht et al. (2008) calculate agency costs at 11.5% in present-
day U.K. firms targeted by activist investors. Meanwhile, Brav et al. (2006) and Klein
and Zur (2006) find a 6% and 7.3% return respectively for activist hedge funds in the
United States. Becht and al. (2008) study in some detail the reforms advocated by
activist investors, that include divesting unfocused assets, limiting acquisitions or capital
expenditures, changing board membership, capital structure, and particularly payout
policy. Cella (2009) finds that long term institutional investors limit the over-investment
problem. From this perspective, private banks can be seen as a force for good, non-
withstanding their dislike for competition.
4 Conclusion
The era of financial capitalism in the United States can teach us a number of lessons.
The first interesting fact is the invention by J.P. Morgan & Co. of the voting trust as
a control device. This allowed private banks to have an important say in a company’s
a↵airs and to create a liquid market for its securities. It would be interesting to consider
if this or a similar device may be used nowadays to have e↵ective governance and liquid
equity markets.
The second finding from that period is that private banks used their power both to
limit competition and to improve governance. Private banks weakened competition by
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becoming watchful agents of symmetric alliances, by encouraging cross shareholdings,
and by greatly extending multi-market contacts. Furthermore, private banks struck at
the root of unstable cartels by threatening to block security issues of maverick railroads
that wanted to build excess capacity or start price wars. From the pre-Sherman studies,
notably MacAvoy’s (1965), we know that maintaining collusion was very important, since
prices fell by about 25 percent with cartel breakdowns.
The Armstrong Investigation argued that private banks seldom intervened in cor-
porate a↵airs, or that if a ”crooked” executive wanted to, he could easily fool outside
directors, even experienced private bankers. This is in line with Chandler’s (1977) belief
that an absolute separation of ownership in control is the only possible outcome in a
market with dispersed equity holders. The results in this paper qualify this view, since
it finds that about 35% of the value created by banks came from better governance. At
6.5% of company value, this improvement was significant.
In summary, private bankers’ methods were socially unsound on the whole, and their
beneficiary corporate governance was insu ciently understood. With all the exposed
drawbacks, Republican and Democratic legislators and Presidents began enacting laws
that prevented private banks from controlling corporations. These laws helped com-
petition but hurt corporate governance, and explain how managers became entrenched
without any countervailing force to check them.
This study has explored the ways in which private banks reduced competition in the
railroad industry. It explained why it was understandable that financial capitalism was
phased out of the United States, even though it had undeniable benefits to shareholders. It
would be interesting to see if the good elements of corporate governance innovations from
a century ago can be used nowadays, without the negative side e↵ects that undoubtedly
existed at the time.
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